When it comes to protecting our systems, it is important to take into account all the options and tactics available. One of the protection strategies within the framework of active cyber defense is called "Cyberdeception" or "Cyberdeception", which is based on the use of techniques that aim to create a distraction or confusion to divert the attacker's attention, hinder their operations and thus protect our assets.
We share with you some references to previous posts on active cyber defense and a webinar to introduce us to cyber crime..
Exploring a little on the subject we can see that this type of strategy is often referenced to Sun Tzu's famous "Art of War", an ancient book of military strategy that has been used for centuries to guide leaders in decision making and victory in war.
"If you know your enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the outcome of a hundred battles."
This famous phrase is one of the only ones mentioned when referring to cyber deception, in this post we will explore some perspectives specific to the Art of War and its correlation in cybersecurity in particular with cyber deception techniques.
The "Art of War" is an ancient book of military strategy written by Sun Tzu, a Chinese general and strategist. The book has been used for centuries as a guide to decision-making and victory in warfare. Although the book was originally written for the military context, its teachings have also been applied to other areas, such as business and politics.
Some of the principles of the "Art of War" include the importance of knowing the enemy (as is well known), the use of surprise and cunning, and the need to maintain the initiative in combat. The whole art of war is based on simulation and deception. These same principles also apply in cyberengaño, where the enemy is a cyberattacker and the battle takes place in cyberspace.
Approaches and correlation
"The principle of invincibility lies in defense, the possibility of victory, in attack."
In this first approach we can also find cybersecurity strategies divided in two, on the one hand the defense, where we refer to the architecture (where we protect from the design) and passive defense techniques (firewalls, access controls, encryption, IDS, vulnerability management, etc.) and, on the other hand, the attack strategies referenced in cyberspace in the active cyber defense.
One of the main objectives of cyber deception techniques is to reduce the dwell time of an attacker with access to protected environments (or within them). The "victory" will then be the detection of this attacker and the subsequent tasks linked to securing the environment in relation to this attacker.
"Experts in war observe the Tao and follow the laws, so they are qualified to plan and execute victorious policies."
TAO refers to a concept fundamental to Eastern philosophy and is commonly translated as "the way" or "the path". It refers to a kind of force or principle that guides the universe and everything that happens in it. It is said that following the "Tao" means acting in accordance with the nature of the universe, rather than trying to fight it or force it to our will.
Mitre Engage proposes a series of actions, divided into strategic and engagement actions. Engagement actions include in themselves the implementation of honeypots, accounts, specifically designed information, complete systems. But all these elements are defined based on the initial strategic actions of preparation (environment planning, threat modeling, definition of operational objectives) and the last actions of understanding (review, threat modeling, intelligence).
Just as cybersecurity must respond to the objectives of our business, cyber-danger operations will only have good results if the planning is well done, this planning and objectives will be going through the operation at all times, defining and limiting it.
"The capable general will offer an apparent triumph to the enemy, he will organize him so that he can hit him where he wants to hit him."
During the planning of a cyber deception operation, there will be information revealed that will function as "supporting information", this non-essential information will give guidelines to the attacker that will guide him along the defined path and serve as validation to support other deception elements. These elements have a complexity that is beyond the scope of technological understanding, they are defined by the cognitive response of the adversary, which of course is at the end of the road human psychology.
"Keep your enemy in tension and wear him down. Create conflict and division among his soldiers."
Other types of information planted in the environment during a cyber-breach operation will be aimed at hindering, and wasting adversary resources. This information comprises a series of elements that an attacker could potentially obtain, but do not provide any value during the phases of an attack. In this type of items we could find for example files that look tempting, encrypted with some weak algorithm using huge keys.
"The capable general fixes the battlefield to his enemies and never lets them take him."
In a cyber-ransomware operation, one of the fundamental elements is the environment in which the operation will take place. This can include networks and sets of servers/services, as long as the attacker is in this environment we can let the operation develop. In these environments, specifically designed, we must consider how the adversary will move and what type of adversary we want to attract, threat modeling will be fundamental for this.
"Against the wise in defense, the enemy will not know where to attack."
A specially shaped piece of false information will not only provide afiction for the attacker, but will also raise the level of ambiguity with respect to all the elements that can be collected in the different phases of an attack. The adversary will not only obtain false elements, but, even detecting their falsity, will have a greater difficulty in determining which of the collected elements are false and which are the real ones from our environment. His operation will be tinged with a tone of doubt.
"If the campaign is too long, the soldiers become fatigued, the weapons lose their edge and the morale of the army drops."
Each of the cyber deception operations will be conformed by phases, which have a beginning for preparation and a closing for the definition of improvements, this allows each of the elements involved during the compromise actions to be clearly defined and correspond to our narrative. An indefinite extension would generate a series of traces and criteria in the deception elements that would degrade their quality in front of an attacker.
"A sensible general will get his troops to stock up on the enemy, because a hundred kilos of the enemy's supplies is equivalent to two thousand of his own."
Cyber threat intelligence will deliver IoCs (Indicators of Compromise) that are aligned to our environments, yet all IoCs collected in cyber-breach operations will be of a higher quality and of course aligned to our environment, as we ourselves are effectively the target of these attackers. Collection will then be one of the objectives of the operation itself.
"Those who do not know how to have maps, do reconnaissance or use local guides are unable to gain advantage of the terrain."
Building a narrative will be fundamental to generate a common thread for cyber deception operations, the only way that deception elements can really camouflage themselves within the IT/OT infrastructure is that they are aligned to the natural functioning of each component found in the environment. Having a clear notion of how information flows between the various services in the infrastructure will be the way to gain an advantage over our terrain.
"To win a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the greatest skill. The greatest skill is to surrender the enemy without fighting."
The active cyber defense strategy, as well as the battles, can give us a victory against the attacker, that is why we make the preparation, design and deployment of the various elements of operations. On the other hand, it is clear that these operations generate wear and tear and require the acceptance of a greater risk, other objectives of cyber-deception actions will be to provide information to the design strategies and passive cyber defense. It will always be preferable to stop the adversary long before he is involved in cyber deception elements. For our organization, this will be "winning without fighting".
"Just as important as having a prepared troop is knowing the enemy's plans. Then you will know what strategy to use and what is not appropriate."
Cyber threat intelligence will provide threat models aligned to our organization and its objectives. Just as these models provide information for risk management, they will also be of particular interest for all protection strategies. Within cyber-breach operations, these will be critical in shaping the narrative and the various engagement actions. A honeypot implemented without a real understanding of the rest of the elements of a cyber deception operation will be like deploying an army towards the base of a mountain that an attacker cannot get through, a waste of resources.
"There are roads not to be traveled, troops not to be attacked, cities not to be stormed and territories not to be disputed."
Traditionally, cyber-attack operations were tinged with the "Hackback" concept, where the target of a cyber-attack launches a direct offensive response against its aggressor. This is natural when analyzing the origins of these operations from the military (of today and in the past as we can see). In the context of an organization, this is not feasible and will not be part of the engagement actions, the legal team (for example) may accompany the definition of cyber-attack operations in order to have clarity on those roads that should not be traveled.
"If the enemy's troops are stronger, avoid combat. "
Every cyber-rogue operation must include a series of "rules of the game", which contemplate clear criteria for the closing of the operations. Each of these actions will have a series of associated risks, this includes a responsibility which we will delimit by defining critical conditions which will guide and limit the operations. An adversary, for example, may obtain information that was not part of the planning.
In summary, active cyber defense strategies especially cyber deception actions have many points in common with Sun Tzu's "Art of War", we can see it in terms of strategy and the use of the various elements of deception to protect against the enemy. This is no coincidence, but the origins of cyber defense in general are completely aligned to the concepts, criteria and of course strategies of traditional military defense.
By applying these principles to our technological environment, analogizing the different factors, we are defining our cyber defense strategies. This understanding and applied analysis will allow us to really maintain an advantage over attackers to protect our networks and systems.